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INTRODUCTION
I was in one board meeting, and I said, "I started this [company] to do positive
things with the world and do good in the Amazon, not necessarily to get a big
payout." . . . And one of [the angel investors] looked me in the eye and said,
"Well, the problem is, then you went out and took $9 million of other people's
money."
1
Legal principles that are almost right are often more mischievous than
those that are completely wrong. What is transparently wrong is interpreted
narrowly (or ignored altogether) and is likely to be repealed. An almost-right
principle invites sloppy thinking, vague generalities, and a general distortion of
the otherwise sound ideas that lie close by. An example of an almost-right
principle that has distorted much of the thinking about corporate law in recent
decades is the oft-repeated maxim that directors of a corporation owe a
fiduciary duty to the shareholders.
* Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago
Law School.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. We are grateful to
Donald Bernstein, William Birdthistle, Robert Bartlett, Ilya Beylin, John Pottow, Mark
Ramseyer, Robert Rasmussen, Lynn Stout, Daniel Sullivan, and Christoph Thole for their
help, as well as workshop participants at the University of Chicago Law School and Stanford
Law School. The Sarah Scaife Foundation and the John M. Olin Foundation provided
research support.
1. Gwendolyn Bounds, The Perils of Being First, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2007, at Rl.
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This principle (embraced by the Supreme Court in the nineteenth century2
and as recently as last May by the Delaware Supreme Court3) is not on its face
silly. A board of directors, as Adam Smith observed long ago, is charged with
taking care of other people's money,4 and it is usual in such cases for the law to
impose special and unremitting duties. After all, directors lack the "anxious
vigilance" that we use when looking after our own money. 5 Hence, directors
should have a general legal duty to care for this money as a reasonable person
would care for it if acting on her own account.
6
The money in question usually is thought to belong to the shareholders.
They contribute capital in the first place, they typically elect the board, and
their blessing is required for major transactions. They stand to gain a dollar if
the directors make the right decision and lose a dollar if they make the wrong
one. In short, "the corporate contract makes managers the agents of the equity
investors." 7 As the residual claimants, and unlike most creditors,8 "[t]hey
receive few explicit promises. Instead they get the right to vote and the
protection of fiduciary principles."
9
But this is not the whole story. The common stockholder is merely one
2. See Koehler v. Black River Falls Iron Co., 67 U.S. (2 Black) 715, 720-21 (1862)
("[Directors] hold a place of trust, and by accepting the trust are obliged to execute it with
fidelity, not for their own benefit, but for the common benefit of the stockholders of the
corporation.").
3. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92
(Del. 2007) ("It is well established that the directors owe their fiduciary obligations to the
corporation and its shareholders.").
4. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 700 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modem Library
1937) (1776). We are not the first to borrow this from Smith. It was the title of a series of
essays by Louis Brandeis published in 1914. See Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S
MONEY AND How BANKERS USE IT (1914) (criticizing bankers who sat on boards and
controlled firms to do the bidding of the bank, despite the fact that the bankers were
investing other people's money). It is also the title of a 2004 screed against investment
bankers and President George W. Bush by a former managing director of Goldman Sachs.
See NOMI PRINS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: THE CORPORATE MUGGING OF AMERICA (2004).
Other People 's Money was also the title of a 1991 film by Norman Jewison starring Danny
DeVito and Gregory Peck (based on a play by Jerry Steme). OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
(Warner Bros. Pictures 1991). OPM was the name of a corporation whose owners possessed
a more acute awareness of acronyms and irony than its customers. It perpetrated one of the
major frauds of the 1980s.
5. SMITH, supra note 4, at 700.
6. The obvious analogy, and one we make below, is to the law of trusts. See infra notes
85-87 and accompanying text.
7. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 91 (1991). Easterbrook and Fischel link the fiduciary obligations of the
directors to the residual claimants, not to equity holders per se. As we explore below, this is
not quite right either.
8. So-called "contract" creditors, or ones who voluntarily enter into loan, bond or other
debt agreements with the firm usually set out many obligations in the investment contract.
Involuntary creditors, such as tort victims, do not, of course, enjoy such protections.
9. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 91.
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flavor of investor. 10 Others, such as lenders, bondholders, and preferred
stockholders, also stand to gain or lose with right or wrong decisions.''
Moreover, with the right package of derivatives, a debtholder can enjoy the
same cashflow rights as an equityholder and vice versa.12 Shareholders
ordinarily control the board, but any number of devices (from loan covenants to
voting trusts) can give this power to other investors, including creditors and
preferred stockholders. 13 As financial innovation has accelerated over the past
two decades, the terms "shareholder" and "debtholder" or "creditor" have
become less meaningful. 14 Identifying only shareholders as investors, as
opposed to all providers of capital, is misleading. The problems likely to arise
10. We are, of course, not the first to point out that shareholders are not always or the
only residual claimants and that larger constituencies need to be taken into account. Blair
and Stout, among others, have done the important work here. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair &
Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 276-87,
314 n.178 (1999); see also Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public
Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005) (arguing for management discretion regarding
corporate philanthropy in part because of multiple claimants); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-
So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1192-95 (2002)
(discussing why shareholders cannot be sole residual claimants).
11. In this Article, we focus narrowly on investors, not on the many others (from
workers to surrounding communities) whom the corporation affects. Our focus here-on the
way that thinking of fiduciary duties running to, or only to, shareholders is an almost-right
but pernicious idea-stands apart from whether the law should oblige the board to take
other, non-financial stakeholders into account. The corporate social responsibility debate is
about taking power away from investors and giving it to stakeholders, whereas our project is
about identifying exactly who the investors are and how to make sense of the relationships
among them.
12. Consider two simple examples. A stockholder (who is in a long position) can buy a
put option to create a floor for any losses and sell a call that would create a ceiling on any
gains. Debtholders can buy call options or get conversion rights that give them the potential
to capture upside beyond the plain terms of their debt contract. There are an infinite number
of permutations that allow both equityholders and debtholders to create such synthetic
positions. This process has been going on for a long time. See Merton H. Miller, Financial
Innovation: The Last Twenty Years and the Next, 21 J. FrN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 459,
460-63 (1986). For a discussion in the context of tax law, see Alvin C. Warren, Jr.,
Commentary, Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107 HARV. L. REV.
460, 461 (1993) ("Continuous disaggregation, recombination, and risk reallocation have
produced a changing array of new financial contracts that pose a serious challenge for the
income tax.").
13. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing
Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209 (2006).
14. With credit derivatives, debt, which was once held in large blocks and subject to
large, heavily negotiated, and covenant-laden contracts, is now sold off into tiny slices to
thousands of investors and is subject to many fewer contractual protections. In other words,
it looks much more like equity. Equity, which is increasingly finding its way into large
private equity funds, takes on some debt-like characteristics, since it is not tradable (at least
for many years) and is often held in large blocks and in convertible forms. We could go on
and on, and in fact, one of us does in other work. See M. Todd Henderson, Monitoring in a
Financially Sophisticated World (2008) (working paper, on file with author). For now it is
sufficient to state that the lines are increasingly blurry.
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are already evident, 15 and the current surge in financial innovation will likely
exacerbate them. 
16
The notion that fiduciary duties are owed to shareholders has not yet
generated seriously wrong-headed outcomes. (Among other things, the
Delaware chancellors are generally too smart to let this happen.) 17
Nevertheless, the reasoning needed to navigate around the sacred cow that the
duty of the directors is owed solely to the shareholders has become increasingly
awkward. People who should know better paint themselves into embarrassing
comers trying to reaffirm the principle. 18 The problem is not as simple as
whether investors have offensive fiduciary duty claims (i.e. whether fiduciary
duties oblige directors to take particular actions). Creditors are more typically
arguing for the disablement of duties owed shareholders. 19 They have sufficient
15. Modem financial engineering enables investors to parse capital structures-cash-
flow rights, voting, and so on-in ways that make any attempt to pigeonhole investments as
one type or another nearly meaningless. One prominent example of the confusion created by
crude labels is the conduct surrounding the proposed merger of Mylan and King, two
pharmaceutical companies. The market believed that this was a bad deal for Mylan (the
buyer) but a good one for King (the target). An investor in King wanted the deal to go
through, so it engaged in a series of transactions whereby it could in effect buy votes in
Mylan, which it would then vote in favor of the deal, without exposing itself to the economic
risk of the transaction-what is known as "vote buying." See John Armour & David A.
Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why?-The Peculiar Divergence
of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEo. L.J. 1727, 1750 (2007) (describing vote
buying in the Mylan-King deal as "abuse" and doubting the SEC's authority to regulate the
practice, absent a new congressional statute). For analysis of the problems that can arise
through this fragmentation of ownership interests, see Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard S. Black,
Debt, Equity, and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk Implications (Univ. of
Tex. Law, Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 120, 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=l 084075.
16. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit
Derivatives, 75 U. CiN. L. REv. 1019 (2007) (describing the new financial products that
allow holders of credit to share risk).
17. Many Delaware cases contain dicta suggesting that the interests of "the
corporation" can be interpreted to include other stakeholders' interests. See, e.g., Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (authorizing takeover measures
designed to protect unenumerated corporate policies). Legal academics and, more
importantly, business people, fall prey to the "shareholders only" mistake with much more
frequency.
18. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate
Duty to Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1321 (2007). Hu and Westbrook argue that directors
should owe their duties exclusively to equityholders until the corporation is in bankruptcy.
Once having done this, however, they must explain how the directors could ever file a
bankruptcy petition (something they think directors should be able to do). They equivocate
about how the shareholders might themselves benefit from a bankruptcy petition (something
that is rarely true), confess that the problem is hard, and then admit that "[m]uch theoretical
and empirical analysis [including many research grants] will be essential in the years ahead."
Id. at 1402.
19. There are "offensive" and "defensive" assertions of owed fiduciary duties by both
shareholders and creditors. Offensive cases are those in which shareholders or creditors
claim that fiduciary duties are owed to them. Shareholders made this claim in Orban v.
1312 [Vol. 60:1309
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influence over the directors such that the directors are willing to take actions in
the creditors' favor, provided only that fiduciary duties owed shareholders do
not constrain them. Directors, who must make difficult decisions and who are
often forgotten in these cases, must also have clear rules about how they should
act-the cases, even if coming to the right result in most instances, leave this
question largely unanswered.
If we are right that fiduciary duties are becoming more harmful than
helpful, the question becomes what principle ought to replace the idea that
fiduciary duties are owed shareholders. The most obvious one follows naturally
from the idea that ex ante investors presumptively are interested in maximizing
the value of the firm. Following the lead of Circuit Judge Easterbrook in In re
Central Ice Cream Co.,20 we might instead adopt the following principle: The
directors must adopt the course that, in their judgment, maximizes the value of
the firm as a whole. This principle of value maximization could also be coupled
with a strong business judgment rule. Courts lack information and expertise
that would allow them to effectively and efficiently police director decisions
and cannot easily determine under any set of facts whether a particular decision
was, when made, designed to maximize firm value. Hence, the directors must
enjoy a large measure of discretion, and claims by one class of investor against
another alleging breach of a fiduciary duty would fail so long as the directors
acted reasonably to enhance firm value.
2 1
Under this view, there is little we can say about the duties of directors other
than that directors should maximize the value of the firm. They rarely, if ever,
will be held liable for a decision that, notwithstanding its effect on one type of
investor, maximizes firm value22 (unless their action violates some specific
Field, No. 12820, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 48 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997), see infra notes 92-99
and accompanying text, and Blackmore Partners v. Link Energy, No. Civ. A 454-N, 2005
WL 2709639 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2005), see infra note 34 and accompanying text. Creditors
made similar claims in North American Catholic Education Programming Foundation, Inc.
v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007). See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
Defensive cases are those in which shareholders or creditors claim that fiduciary duties are
not owed to the other. An example of a shareholder defensive claim is In re Central Ice
Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1987). See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
Creditors made a defensive claim in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N. V. v. Pathe
Communications Corp., No. Civ. A. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). See
infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
20. In re Central Ice Cream, 836 F.2d 1068; see infra notes 74-77 and accompanying
text.
21. For an insightful analysis of the way in which traditional focus upon the agency
costs between shareholders and managers falls short, see Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture
Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REv. 37,
71-74 (2006) (discussing agency conflicts in venture capital contracts among investors as
well as between managers and shareholders).
22. See Blair & Stout, supra note 10, at 298-309, 321-22 ("In particular . . .
shareholders should be allowed to sue directors only when this serves the interest of the
corporation as a whole, rather than serving shareholders' interests at the expense of other
stakeholders.").
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covenant or by-law), and directors invite trouble (but do not necessarily expose
themselves to liability) if they make a decision that reduces the value of the
corporation. This view follows from the traditional law and economics
approach to corporate law.
2 3
In this Article, however, we suggest that this approach too may be wanting.
Sophisticated investors negotiating for combinations of cash-flow and control
rights might well choose models that depart from the simple one that requires
directors to always maximize firm value. In some instances the efficient ex ante
bargain may include terms that look inefficient ex post.24 For example,
creditors may need to be able to have the ability to engage in self-serving
behavior that compromises the value of the business as a whole in order to
ensure that the shareholders have the right set of incentives in the previous
period. In other words, the real option for one investor to take disproportionate
value from the firm under certain circumstances gives other investors and
managers incentives to avoid these circumstances. Imposing a value-
maximizing duty, even with a strong business judgment rule, may be contrary
to what the investors want in their ex ante bargain.
At first cut, we should respect the choices investors and directors make,
even if they seem to create situations where the board acts in ways that appear
to destroy firm value.25 Corporate finance and corporate governance are not
one-size-fits-all, and firm capital structures are heterogeneous, complex,
negotiated, and, most importantly, priced by the market. From this perspective,
courts should tread lightly, even when faced with self-serving behavior, lest
they upset what they do not understand.26 Our understanding of capital
23. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A
Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REv. 1, 29-30 (1990) (arguing that
fiduciary duties are simply part of the private ordering of control rights). For a discussion of
other work that focuses on the idea of maximizing firm value, see infra notes 88-89.
24. One possibility is the incentive-to-do-well argument we float below. See infra
notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
25. This is especially true when there is little reason to doubt that the contracts were
entered into voluntarily, by parties with knowledge about the terms of the contract and with
more or less equal bargaining power.
26. An important distinction here must be made between director conduct that is
purely self-serving and conduct that is doing the bidding of those who installed them and
that may incidentally benefit the director personally. Imagine two cases: in the first, a
director elected by shareholders votes to approve a transaction in which the firm buys a piece
of land from him at a significant premium to its market value; in the second, a director
appointed pursuant to a contract with a senior creditor, votes to approve a transaction that
benefits the creditor (and himself) at the expense of the common shareholders. As we discuss
below, it is possible, perhaps even likely, that the second case is a part of the efficient ex
ante bargain among investors, and courts should be cautious before disrupting these
transactions. The first is obviously a classic self-dealing transaction that any court would
disrupt absent ratification by a disinterested board or shareholder vote. Of course, there is a
danger that courts will not be able to readily distinguish these two cases (and that the
directors in the first case will dress it up to look like the second), but these concerns are
overblown. The world we imagine-where there are no fiduciary duties-is one that would
1314 [Vol. 60:1309
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structures is simply too primitive for us to do much more than enforce the
contracts that are written as best we can. The default rules we devise-and
fiduciary obligations are simply one of these 27 -should be in service of these
contracts. 28 Imposing duties on directors that are too rigid or too mechanical
may limit the ability of investors to create capital structures that are beyond the
ken of those writing the rules.
29
This is especially true since investors cannot easily opt out of a fiduciary
duty once it is put in place.30 Hence, it may make sense to eliminate the
concept of fiduciary duty from corporate law altogether. 3 1 Rather than any
still permit courts to police obvious self dealing, while preserving the ability of investors to
bargain for efficient control rights. Red flags will be raised not only in cases where directors
profit personally in ways that are unique to them, but also in cases in which directors vote in
ways that are different from the interests of those who installed them on the board.
27. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36
J.L. & ECON. 425 (1993) (arguing that fiduciary duties are necessary gap filling by courts for
incomplete contracts written by shareholders and firms).
28. The principal virtue of using fiduciary duties is contracting efficiency. Inevitable
gaps in control right contracts might permit powerful individuals to engage in unanticipated
self-serving behavior, thus increasing the firm's cost of capital or, at a minimum, the
transaction costs of doing deals as lawyers try to negotiate ever more comprehensive
agreements. One solution is to use the duty of good faith and fair dealing as is commonly
done with ordinary contracts.
29. There is a robust literature on the so-called "common agency" problem-that is,
where multiple principals (investors) are designing an incentive structure for a single agent
(managers). See, e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Common Agency, 54
ECONOMETRICA 923 (1986); Joel S. Demski & David Sappington, Optimal Incentive
Contracts with Multiple Agents, 33 J. ECON. THEORY 152 (1984); Bengt Holmstrdm & Paul
Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and
Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (1991). The models in this work are largely unhelpful
here, since they deal with coordination issues, private information, and incentive schemes
designed in environments that look very little like the ex ante corporate bargain. See, e.g.,
Fahad Khalil et al., Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting,
135 J. ECON. THEORY 35 (2007) (modeling the monitoring incentives of principals in the face
of privately informed agents and financial contracts designed in isolation of each other).
30. See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,
1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 887 ("[F]iduciary obligation sometimes operates precisely in opposition
to intention as manifest in express agreements."); see also id. at 923 ("A provision in a trust
instrument cannot relieve a trustee of liability for any profit derived from a breach of
trust .... ). The Uniformed Trust Code limits the ability of the parties to modify fiduciary
duties. Section 105(b)(2) and (3) provide that the parties may not waive "the duty of the
trustee to act in good faith and in accordance with the purposes of the trust" nor "the
requirement that a trust and its terms be for the benefit of the beneficiaries." UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 105 (2005).
31. Firms are, with shareholder approval, generally authorized to indenmify directors
for some breaches of fiduciary duties. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West
2008). Indemnification is limited to cases not involving bad faith and is ineffective at
preventing suits designed to extract payment short of the final disposition of the case.
Furthermore, the existence of a financial cushion for directors does not necessarily give the
right incentives to those directors who want to do what the law requires instead of what
won't cost them personally. Indemnification also does not lessen the bite of fiduciary duties
in other related areas, like duties to disclose. See infra Part IV.
March 2008] 1315
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generalized duty to shareholders or to the firm or to sometimes shareholders
and sometimes creditors, directors should merely be obliged to honor the terms
of the firm's investment contracts, even when they lead to decisions that are not
value-maximizing ex post for the investors as a group. Directors would merely
have the duty to attend to the affairs of the corporation and act in good faith, a
duty owed to investors and strangers alike. In this world, shareholders, like
creditors, must protect themselves through their powers under the corporate
charter and the by-laws.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I shows how the maxim that
fiduciary duties are owed to shareholders cannot be reconciled even with
current doctrine. Part II goes on to show how the effort to sort out with greater
particularity what duties are owed to whom is doomed to fail. Here we use the
recent mess in Delaware over fiduciary duties in the "zone of insolvency" as
our principal exhibit. This Part goes on to examine the paradigm that sits most
comfortably with current thinking about corporate law in the courts and in the
academy-the idea of fiduciary duties being owed to the firm as a whole,
coupled with a strong business judgment rule. Part III shows how this principle
itself may be wanting and sets out an alternative paradigm, one in which no
fiduciary duties exist at all, and directors face liability for their decisions (other
than for neglect or surreptitious self-dealing)32 only if they violate a contractual
obligation owed to a shareholder, creditor, or other investor.
Part IV briefly shows how separating corporate law from conceptions of
duty brings needed clarity to the often-litigated issue of disclosure duties. 33 The
problem, we suggest, is largely contractual, and in setting the default rules, the
focus should be on the ability of parties to opt out---or opt in.
I. FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO SHAREHOLDERS
Directors routinely make decisions that unambiguously favor creditors and
other investors at the expense of the holders of common stock. The most
obvious example is the filing of a bankruptcy petition, the immediate effect of
which is to destroy the option value of the equity of the business for the benefit
of creditors. No one claims that doing this violates directors' duties, and courts
generally do not intervene in decisions about whether to file a bankruptcy
petition.34 This is only the most obvious example of what boards can do at the
32. For the importance of maintaining a prohibition on self dealing by insiders and
directors, see Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 209.
33. As we show, modem securities law and doctrines such as insider trading are
premised entirely on state-law fiduciary duties. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S.
642, 662 (1997) (noting that "§ 10(b) liability 'is premised upon a duty to disclose arising
from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction' (citing
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980))).
34. In Odyssey Partners, L.P., v. Fleming Companies, Inc., 735 A.2d 386 (Del. Ch.
1999), a shareholder sued for breach of fiduciary duty on the ground that the firm did not file
1316 [Vol. 60:1309
HeinOnline  -- 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1316 2007-2008
OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
expense of shareholders and to the benefit of other investors. When the
examples are tallied together, the conventional account of fiduciary duties
being owed to shareholders cannot be reconciled with existing law, even when
coupled with an extremely deferential business judgment rule.
A. Board Discretion
A board of directors can combine two businesses in a manner that denies
shareholders of one the ability to vote on the transaction. 35 For example, in
Delaware, shareholders of both the "buyer" and "seller" are entitled to vote on
all statutory mergers. 36 The board of a buyer, however, can take the vote away
from its own shareholders by structuring the merger as a triangular merger: the
board creates a subsidiary firm of the buyer, of which the buyer firm is the only
shareholder, and then executes a merger between the seller firm and the
subsidiary.3 7 The subsidiary holds a vote on the merger, and the buyer firm
votes its one share in the subsidiary (as per a majority vote of the buyer's
board) in favor of the merger. There is no judicial check, say through a
"business purpose" test, on the rationale for structuring a merger in the form of
a triangle, nor any need to show that the structure maximizes firm value. 3 8
The board may do the same thing with shareholders' appraisal rights.3 9 The
right to receive a judicial appraisal of shares in a merger, like the right to vote,
is enshrined in state corporate law statutes. The origin of the appraisal remedy
can be traced back to the change in the voting rule for certain fundamental
transactions from unanimity to majority rule-the appraisal right was the quid
for the quo of allowing transactions to proceed against the will of certain
a Chapter 11 petition, and instead allowed another shareholder, who was the firm's largest
creditor, to foreclose on firm assets. The court rejected this claim, noting that the board
balanced the effects of various courses of action on shareholders and "creditors and other
corporate constituencies" and the decision was to be respected so long as it was not "disloyal
to [the firm], taken as a whole." Id. at 420; see also Blackmore Partners, LLP, v. Link
Energy, Inc., No. Civ.A. 454-N, 2005 WL 2709639 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2005) (holding that
the board could take actions that benefited creditors at the expense of shareholders-that is,
getting nothing for shareholders in an asset sale after rejecting a plan that would have
returned something to equity holders).
35. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 25 1(c) (West 2008) (providing that a merger is valid
only if approved by a majority of shareholders of both buyer and seller).
36. See id. (providing that a vote must be taken by "each constituent corporation" to
the agreement).
37. Various permutations of this basic idea allow selling-firm shareholders to
accomplish a similar result.
38. See, e.g., Rauch v. RCA Corp., 861 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1988) (rejecting claims that a
triangular merger was an improper redemption of stock under Delaware law); Hariton v.
ARCO Elecs., Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1963) (rejecting business purpose test and de
facto merger doctrine).
39. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (West 2008) (giving shareholders who vote no on
certain business combination transactions the right to a judicial appraisal process of the value
of their shares at the time of the transaction).
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shareholders.40 It was viewed as an essential stick in a shareholder's bundle of
rights. And yet, boards can take it away, and can do so for no reason at all.
Boards may structure transactions for the sole purpose of limiting the ability of
shareholders to perfect appraisal rights.
4 1
The board may also decide, on its own or at the behest of a majority
shareholder, to buy out the shares of the minority shareholders even if this is
not in the best interests of minority shareholders. 42 It may do so even without
stating a business purpose and without any consideration as to the impact on
minority shareholders. As the Delaware Supreme Court has held on many
occasions, "[i]t is ... settled under Delaware law that minority stock interests
may be eliminated by merger." 43 It also may do so without sharing the control
premium: controlling shareholders, who also owe fiduciary duties to minority
shareholders, may sell their control shares without sharing the control premium
with the minority.
44
In day-to-day activities, long-term project choices, and fundamental
transactions, boards may prefer long-term shareholders over short-term
shareholders or vice versa. There is no ready check on this ability to choose
which type of shareholder to prefer. In addition, the board or a director may
even engage in self-dealing transactions, subject only to the requirement that
the transaction be fair to the corporation as an entity.
4 5
40. Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders' Appraisal Remedy and How Courts
Determine Fair Value, 47 DuKE L.J. 613, 614-15 (1998) ("The origin of the appraisal
remedy typically is tied to the move in corporate law to majority approval of fundamental
corporate changes, and away from a requirement of unanimous shareholder consent. When
unanimous approval was no longer required, and shareholders effectively lost their
individual right to veto corporate changes, the appraisal remedy was provided to them in
return.").
41. See, e.g., Hariton, 188 A.2d at 125 (blessing merger and rejecting business purpose
test and de facto merger doctrine). The Delaware Supreme Court blessed a transaction
structured as an asset sale (where selling firm shareholders get no appraisal rights) instead of
a merger (where they do). This particular ability to act in a way that is contrary to
shareholder interests has not been accepted in all jurisdictions, even those with similar
statutes, precisely because the act of disenfranchisement or disabling of important rights is
viewed as antithetical to the fiduciary-based directorial mission. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§
181, 1200, 1201, 1300 (West 2008) (creating voting and appraisal rights parity among
different business combination transactions to discourage transaction design intended to limit
statutory and common law fights of shareholders).
42. To cite just a few of the innumerable examples, a buyout may have severe tax
consequences for minority shareholders or may deprive minority shareholders of potential
appreciation in the firm's shares.
43. Rothschild Int'l Corp. v. Liggett Group Inc., 474 A.2d 133, 136 (Del. 1984).
44. See, e.g., Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 387 (N.Y. 1979). While
inconsistent with traditional notions of fiduciary duty, these decisions likely vindicate the
investor's ex ante bargain. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 119 ("If control
transactions produce gains, and if the gains depend on unequal allocation, then the expected
wealth... maximized by a rule allowing unequal allocation. All share prices ex ante will be
highest when the probability of a value-increasing transaction in the future is the greatest.").
45. See, e.g., Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 502 (Del. Ch. 2003) ("In a typical
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Shareholders may also waive their rights to the duties they are owed,
something that sits uncomfortably with the notion of a fiduciary. The ability to
waive is seen neither in the law of trusts nor in any other area where fiduciary
duties have bite.4 6 Indeed, several of corporate law's most famous cases are
about explicit or implicit waivers of duties owed by directors or majority
shareholders. For example, in Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., Ingle was
hired to run the firm and was appointed a director.4 7 As part of his employment
contract, Ingle agreed to sell back his shares to the firm if he left for any
reason.48 When Ingle was forced out many years later in a corner-office coup,
he challenged his termination on the ground that he was, as a minority
shareholder, owed a fiduciary duty by the firm and was protected against
opportunistic conduct by them. 49 The court rejected his plea, holding in effect
that whatever fiduciary duties Ingle was owed as a minority shareholder were
waived through his employment contract.
50
Similarly, in Gallagher v. Lambert, an employee of a closely held firm
entered into an employment agreement and a buy-sell agreement, which
provided that for the first three years of his employment his shares would have
to be sold back at book value. 5 1 When the firm fired him just three weeks
before the buyback period ended (taking about $3 million in potential profits
from him), the employee-shareholder sued, claiming a breach of fiduciary
duty.52 The court rejected the claim. The shareholder had effectively waived his
fiduciary duties by entering into the shareholder agreement-in other words,
the parties' contract "define[d] the scope of the relevant fiduciary duty." 5 3
Boards can engage in a variety of maneuverings with the corporate form
that allow them to change the rights of shareholders in ways that may not be in
the shareholders' financial interest. 54 For example, in a recapitalization, the
derivative suit involving a transaction between a director and her corporation, that director is
interested because she is on the other side of the transaction from the corporation and faces
liability if the entire fairness standard applies, regardless of her subjective good faith, so long
as she cannot prove that the transaction was fair to the corporation." (emphasis added)).
46. See DeMott, supra note 30.
47. 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1312 (N.Y. 1989) ("[The parties] entered into a written
shareholders' agreement which provided that... Glamore would nominate and vote Ingle as
a director ... of the corporation.").
48. See id. at 1312 ("The agreement gave Glamore the right to repurchase all of Ingle's
stock if 'Ingle shall cease to be an employee of the Corporation for any reason' (emphasis
added).").
49. Id. at 1312-13.
50. See id. at 1313 ("A minority shareholder in a close corporation, by that status
alone, who contractually agrees to the repurchase of his shares upon termination of his
employment for any reason, acquires no right from the corporation or majority shareholders
against at-will discharge.").
51. 549 N.E.2d 136, 136 (N.Y. 1989).
52. Id. at 137.
53. Id.
54. The ability of the board to engage in single-firm reorganizations or
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board can, by creating a shell corporation with a new financial structure and
then merging the old firm into the shell, eliminate a particular class of stock.55
Firms may also reincorporate to a more management friendly state like
Delaware, even if this is not in the interests of a particular class of shareholders.
Boards can also act in ways that are overtly beneficial to creditors, who in
the traditional account are owed no extra-contractual duties and whose contract
rights would seem to be trumped by any shareholder fiduciary rights. For one,
creditors can bargain for voting trusts and thereby gain control of the board.56
The whole point of such devices is to put in place directors who will not do
what the shareholders want. A bankruptcy filing, which directors make and
which destroys all shareholder value for the benefit of creditors, is just the
culmination of creditor-preferring behavior. 57 This ability to control the shut-
down decision sits uncomfortably with the claim that creditor-appointed
directors cannot act in ways beneficial to those who put them on the board.
Existing law then leaves us in a peculiar place. As a general matter,
shareholders lose when they complain about decisions of directors that are
wealth-maximizing for the corporation as a whole, but contrary to the interests
of the common shareholders. At the same time, however, courts continue to
give lip-service to the idea that directors act for the benefit of the shareholders.
Just last May, for example, the Delaware Supreme Court noted, "[t]he directors
of Delaware corporations have the legal responsibility to manage the business
of a corporation for the benefit of its shareholders owners. Accordingly,
fiduciary duties are imposed upon the directors to regulate their conduct when
they perform that function."'5 Hence, courts are asked to reconcile a core
principle with accepted practices inconsistent with it. 59
recapitalizations varies by state.
55. See, e.g., Fed. United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A.2d 331 (Del. 1940) (permitting firm
to eliminate preferred stock, and its dividend arrearages, through recapitalization).
56. This most commonly occurs in firms in financial distress, but nothing prevents this
from being used in healthy or near-healthy firms. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 13, at
1215-17 (describing the control creditors exercise in financially distressed firms); see also
M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation When Agency
CostsAre Low, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1543, 1596 (2007) (same).
57. There are a few rare Chapter 11 cases in which shareholders do enjoy some
recovery, but this remote possibility does not mean that the directors are somehow acting on
the shareholders' behalf. In any event, in a perfectly standard prepackaged bankruptcy in
which equity is wiped out, the directors approve a course of conduct that cannot possibly be
in the shareholders' interests, yet no one suggests approving the filing of such a bankruptcy
petition constitutes a violation of their fiduciary duties.
58. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101
(Del. 2007) (internal citation omitted). For an argument that the confusion generated by
applying fiduciary duties to creditors justifies an elimination of all derivative rights of
shareholders, see Ann E. Conway, Trenwalla: A Call for Rationalizing Fiduciary Duties to
Creditors in Delaware (Widener Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-09, 2007),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=991224.
59. Another basis for the shareholder-only nature of fiduciary duties is that shareholder
contracts, insofar as they exist, are more open ended and ambiguous than creditor contracts,
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B. The Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule is the crutch courts use most often to navigate
around the maxim that directors owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders, at times
in ways that distort the idea of fiduciary duty beyond recognition. One of the
best known examples is the old chestnut of Shlensky v. Wrigley. The plaintiff
challenged the Wrigley board's refusal to install lights at Wrigley Field, home
of the Chicago Cubs baseball team, despite the fact that every other team
played night games, and playing at night seemed to be the value-maximizing
strategy. Defendant board members did not argue that their actions were
actually value maximizing for shareholders (say, through building a unique
brand), but rather grounded their argument in the idiosyncratic preferences of
Wrigley's majority owner-that baseball is a daytime game and that lights
would hurt the surrounding community.6 1 The board effectively flaunted the
fact that it was deliberately not trying to maximize shareholder value.
62
The court granted the board's motion to dismiss, establishing a strong
business judgment rule that prevents plaintiffs from even inquiring into the
rationale for the board's decision.63 Plaintiffs got nowhere with their argument
that directors were favoring others (in this case, non-investors like the game of
baseball or the neighborhood, and certainly the idiosyncratic preferences of one
shareholder) over shareholders. 64 Because of the business judgment rule, board
members also have the authority to donate to charity, which is one view of
what Mr. Wrigley was doing, and take other actions that do not need to be
and fiduciary duties are merely judicial gap fillers of contracts that would be too costly to
write in detail. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 90-93. Judges are thus
delegated the job of writing ex post contracts because writing them ex ante would be
impossible or too expensive. This rationale, insofar as it obtains for shareholders, is
becoming less unique to shareholders as credit derivatives and other financial innovations
blur the lines between debt and equity. In other words, holders of debt are increasingly
dispersed and disinterested in the way shareholders are, and credit contracts are containing
fewer and fewer contractual restrictions and specifications. See Henderson, supra note 14.
60. 237 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) ("[Compared to the Chicago White Sox,
t~he weekend attendance figures for the two teams was [sic] similar; however, the White Sox
week-night games drew many more patrons than did the Cubs' weekday games.").
61. See id. at 778 ("Wrigley ... refused to install lights, not because of interest in the
welfare of the corporation but because of his personal opinions 'that baseball is a "daytime
sport" and that the installation of lights and night baseball games will have a deteriorating
effect upon the surrounding neighborhood.').
62. See id ("It is alleged that he has admitted that he is not interested in whether the
Cubs would benefit financially from such action ... ").
63. See id. at 780 (stating that absent a showing of fraud, illegality or conflict of
interest, a decision properly before the directors was "beyond [the court's] jurisdiction and
ability").
64. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATIoN LAW & EcONOMics 245 (2002) (arguing
that the plaintiffs' inability to surpass a motion to dismiss shows that the business judgment
rule is an abstention doctrine-that courts don't even inquire into business decisions that are
made in good faith).
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justified in terms of shareholder wealth maximization. 65
The business judgment rule also gives boards wide latitude in determining
what litigation is conducted by shareholders on behalf of the corporation. The
rule permits boards, in most instances, to curtail litigation that might benefit
shareholders. Boards enjoy near carte blanche to avoid derivative suits against
the firm that might be in the interest of one class of stakeholders, say the
shareholders, but contrary to the interests of another class, say the creditors, or
vice versa. 66
Under the shield of the business judgment rule, the board can even take
actions that deliberately benefit creditors at the expense of shareholders, so
long as the decision is based in facts, well considered, in good faith, and not
conflicted by any personal interests of a majority of directors. 67 Even decisions
that seem plainly to hurt shareholders are protected by the business judgment
rule, as long as the procedural predicates are met.
68
As one court noted, the business judgment rule "bars judicial inquiry into
actions . . . in the . . . legitimate furtherance of corporate purposes." 69 The
important pressure point here is the word "corporate," which speaks to the
value of the corporation as a whole, as opposed to the value of its constituent
parts. A leading commentator defines fiduciary duties as "a bargained-for term
of the board-shareholder contract by which the directors agree not to make
Kaldor-Hicks efficient decisions that leave shareholders worse off."'70 But the
65. See, e.g., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953) (refusing to
review gift to Princeton University by small manufacturing company whose CEO was an
alumnus). Of course, charitable contributions and other such actions could be justified on
shareholder wealth maximization grounds, such as building brand or employee loyalty, but
the law does not require this. For example, Delaware empowers boards to donate to charity
without regard to its purpose. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (West 2008) ("Every
corporation created under this chapter shall have power to: . . . (9) Make donations for the
public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes, and in time of war or
other national emergency in aid thereof .... ").
66. While the demand-requirement process is complicated, the practical essence is that
well-advised plaintiffs do not make a demand in a derivative case. Making demand is an
admission that demand is required, and the board may refuse demand under the shield of the
business judgment rule. So if the plaintiffs make a demand, they lose, even if the lawsuit is
fairly clearly in the best interests of shareholders. In almost all cases, therefore, plaintiffs
will plead that demand was futile, alleging that the board was interested, tainted by a
dominating shareholder or director who has a conflict, or the board is otherwise incapable of
making a decision that is in the best interest of the corporation. See, e.g., Grimes v. Donald,
673 A.2d 1207, 1219 (Del. 1996).
67. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 414-15 (discussing state stakeholder
constituency statutes).
68. See, e.g., Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976)
(holding that director decision to distribute dividend of subsidiary stock was protected by the
business judgment rule, despite the fact that the firm retaining the stock and marking it to
market would have saved shareholders about $8 million).
69. Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979).
70. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little? Directors' Fiduciary Duties in the
Vicinity of Insolvency, 1 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 335, 359 (2007).
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business judgment rule in operation is plainly inconsistent with this definition.
Indeed, applying this conception of the business judgment rule, even with a
highly deferential standard of review, would unsettle many well-established
practices.
The business judgment rule, however, is an awkward tool for giving
directors the legal guidance they need to make good decisions. Deferring to the
directors' judgment is not the same as acknowledging that under some
circumstances the proper decision runs counter to the shareholders' interests.
Among other things, many directors want to do what they are supposed to do.
That the business judgment rule would protect them even if they did something
that ran counter to their duties is not what matters to them.
Moreover, the business judgment rule invites circumlocution. Consider
directors who make a decision they believe is in the best interest of the
corporation as a whole (and consistent with the investors' ex ante bargain) but
contrary to the interests of shareholders. Given the fiduciary duty maxim and
its pervasiveness, overt recognition by the directors that they are not acting in
the interest of shareholders is best avoided. Instead of clear-headed analysis,
discussion becomes couched in terms that are somewhat tortured, but less likely
to make waves. This phenomenon has unfortunately become all too common in
many areas of corporate law. 71 Turning board meetings into games in which
many actions are taken and much money spent merely to give legal cover to
decisions is wasteful and erodes confidence in law and process in general. In
addition, directors may come to believe that the games are real, which may lead
them to take actions that destroy firm value.
II. A DUTY TO MAXIMIZE FIRM VALUE
In recent years, courts have been forced in some cases to retreat from the
traditional account of fiduciary duties being owed exclusively to
shareholders. 72 For the most part, they have tried to do this by finding fiduciary
duties are sometimes owed to others.7 3 The facts of In re Central Ice Cream
Co. provide an excellent illustration of the problem the courts have faced and
how they have confronted it.
74
71. In one of corporate law's most famous cases, the Delaware Supreme Court held
directors personally liable for agreeing to sell a struggling firm in a terrible industry at a
huge premium for shareholders. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). The
lesson for directors from such cases is not to reject similar deals when they come along, but
to go through the motions of getting advice from bankers and lawyers, shopping the firm to
other buyers, and acting in the ways that the law says they must.
72. For a recent discussion of the issue, see Cory Dean Kandestin, Note, The Duty to
Creditors in Near-Insolvent Firms: Eliminating the "Near-Insolvency" Distinction, 60
VAND. L. REV. 1235 (2007).
73. See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., No.
Civ. A. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
74. In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1987).
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The Central Ice Cream Company owed its general creditors about $12
million.75 It had closed its doors, and its only asset was a lawsuit against
McDonald's. Central Ice Cream prevailed at trial and received a $52 million
judgment. At this point, McDonald's made a settlement offer of $16 million.
The general creditors, as one might expect, wanted it accepted post haste. If
Central Ice Cream took the offer, they would be paid in full. By contrast, if
Central turned it down, the judgment might be reversed on appeal and leave
them with nothing. The shareholders, again none too surprisingly, wanted the
offer rejected. They would receive only $4 million if the settlement offer were
accepted, but they would get more than $40 million if Central Ice Cream
refused to settle and ultimately prevailed on appeal. Getting the $40 million
was not certain, but risking $4 million to get $40 million with reasonable odds
is a good bet.
Neither the shareholders nor the creditors of Central Ice Cream are the
residual claimants over all dimensions. More importantly, neither group will act
with the interest of the other in mind. To see this clearly, tweak the facts
slightly and assume that the settlement offer was for exactly $12 million. If
each type of investor cared only about its own economic interests, the creditors
would accept the offer and the shareholders would reject it, regardless of the
company's chances of prevailing in the end.
For the judge who had to confront this problem (Frank Easterbrook), there
was an easy answer. Central Ice Cream was in bankruptcy, and bankruptcy law
requires the trustee to maximize the value of the estate. Hence, she need only
assess the settlement offer on its merits. If, for example, the settlement offer
were for exactly one quarter of the judgment, she need ask simply whether
Central Ice Cream has a better than twenty-five percent chance of prevailing on
appeal.76 In re Central Ice Cream does not speak directly to directors'
obligations outside of bankruptcy. Nevertheless, Judge Easterbrook's opinion
sends a strong message cautioning against considering only the interests of
shareholders in corporate decisionmaking, and the Delaware chancellors
listened.77
Several years after In re Central Ice Cream, a Delaware chancellor in
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N. V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.
considered the In re Central Ice Cream problem and suggested that in such
75. This hypothetical has been one of the central fixtures of corporate law over the last
decade. It is set out in Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55.
76. We are oversimplifying here, of course. We assume that the appeal is an all-or-
nothing affair and that there are no costs associated with such an appeal. These do not
change the underlying problem.
77. The evidence for this is indirect. The Delaware courts have not cited In re Central
Ice Cream, but merely converted its facts into a hypothetical (including numbers that make it
extremely unlikely that it was a mere coincidence). For his part, while long a major voice in
corporate law, now-Chief Judge Easterbrook has never shown any sign he is even aware of
the controversy In re Central Ice Cream has spawned.
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situations, those in which the business is in the "zone of insolvency," the duties
of the directors run to the creditors as well as to the shareholders. 7 8 Hence,
directors who use their best judgment do not violate their duties even if the
decision favors creditors at the expense of shareholders: "At least where a
corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not
merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate
enterprise." 79 The court posited a set of facts like those in In re Central Ice
Cream and explained:
[I]f we consider the community of interests that the corporation represents it
seems apparent that one should in this hypothetical accept the best settlement
offer .... But that result will not be reached by a director who thinks he owes
duties directly to shareholders only. It will be reached by directors who are
capable of conceiving of the corporation as a legal and economic entity. Such
directors will recognize that in managing the business affairs of a solvent
corporation in the vicinity of insolvency, circumstances may arise when the
right (both the efficient and the fair) course to follow for the corporation may
diverge from the choice that the stockholders (or the creditors, or the
employees, or any single group interested in the corporation) would make if
given the opportunity to act.
80
The difficulty-one that the courts have wrestled with ever since Credit
Lyonnais-is making operational sense of this observation. 8 1 Assume, for
example, that McDonald's puts on the table a settlement offer that is less than
what the creditors are owed. Can a director reject it out of hand on the ground
that it leaves the shareholders with nothing? The Delaware Supreme Court
decided this year that creditors never have a direct action in such a case, but it
left the door open for allowing them to bring a derivative action against such a
director.
82
The ability of creditors to bring an action against the directors, however, is
not the question that courts usually confront when the interests of both creditors
and shareholders are implicated. The facts of Credit Lyonnais present the
problem in its typical form. MGM-Pathe Communications, the defendant in the
78. The court was not writing on an entirely blank slate. Before Credit Lyonnais courts
had previously noted that the duty of the directors shifts to creditors when the corporation is
insolvent. See, e.g., FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1982); Davis v.
Woolf, 147 F.2d 629, 633 (4th Cir. 1945). This doctrine had (and continues to have) little
bite in practice both because of the business judgment rule and because it is usually hard to
tell whether a firm is in fact insolvent.
79. Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34.
80. Id. at *34 n.55.
81. For an analysis of the way Credit Lyonnais redirects the board's focus without
actually imposing legal liability, see Jonathan C. Lipson, The Expressive Function of
Directors'Duties to Creditors, 12 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 224 (2007).
82. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101
(Del. 2007). Of course, only directors who are extremely badly advised can ever be tagged
with liability. As long as the directors go through the motions and assert that they assessed
the settlement offer in light of the interests of everyone, they will be protected by the
business judgment rule.
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case, found itself in difficult financial straits. The firm-saving deal ultimately
reached between the banks and the principal shareholder excluded the latter
from exercising control rights until a specified amount of debt was paid down.
This shareholder urged the directors to sell enough of the assets of the business
to return him to power. The directors refused on the ground that the sale of
assets was not in the interests of the corporation as a whole.
The creditors had no need to call upon courts to ensure that the directors
paid attention to their interests. They had set things up so that the directors
would look out for them-provided that a court did not interfere.83 To protect
the creditors' interests-and to vindicate the ex ante bargain-the court needed
only a reason to refrain from acting. Instead of seeking to impose liability on
the directors, the creditors wanted to ensure that liability would not be imposed
on the directors for decisions that favored them. In other words, fiduciary duties
to shareholders stood in the way of free and efficient contracting.
By asserting that fiduciary duties turn on the identity of the residual
claimant (and that creditors are therefore also owed duties when the firm is in
the "zone of insolvency"), a court avoids having to use the business judgment
rule in circumstances when a decision, however sensible, is transparently
contrary to the interests of the shareholders. It is, however, far from being a
satisfactory solution to the problem. One cannot simply transplant the duties
ordinarily owed to shareholders to creditors even when they are unambiguously
the residual claimants. The positions of creditors and shareholders are not the
same. They typically enjoy radically different control rights, different
information, different bargaining positions, and different risk profiles. Hence,
we should not assume that the running default obligations of directors to
creditors parallel to those owed to shareholders is value maximizing ex ante. 84
Most of those who attack Credit Lyonnais have failed to appreciate the
dynamic the court confronted. The creditors were not asserting that the
directors owed them a duty, merely that notion of fiduciary duty owed to
shareholders should not prevent the directors from taking actions that were in
the creditors' interest and in the interest of the firm as a whole. When creditors
are the residual owners, they do not need the affirmative protection of fiduciary
duties. It suffices if the law merely allows the contractual mechanisms they put
in place to operate effectively, and contractual mechanisms can operate
effectively, as long as courts do not create duties that interfere with them.
83. For an argument that contract can serve the same function as proposals to expand
fiduciary duties to creditors, see Frederick Tung, The New Death of Contract: Creeping
Corporate Fiduciary Duties for Creditors (Emory L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 07-24,
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1031242. See also Simone M. Sepe, Directors'
Duty to Creditors and the Debt Contract, 1 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 553, 562 (2007) (arguing for a
contract-based view of duties to creditors).
84. See Kelli A. Alces & Larry E. Ribstein, Directors' Duties in Failing Firms, 3 J.
Bus. & TECH. L. (forthcoming 2008) (arguing that there are no director fiduciary duties in
the zone of insolvency, and that all of the cases supposedly so holding can really be
explained by the business judgment rule).
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Contracts are, of course, incomplete, and judges must fill in gaps, but they
should not invoke fiduciary duties to fill them. Fiduciary duties have the effect
of resolving ambiguity in favor of whoever is the beneficiary of the fiduciary
duty and, in the abstract, there is no reason to think that this advances the
parties' interests.
This observation suggests that corporate law should follow the lead of
Judge Easterbrook in In re Central Ice Cream: The duties of the directors
should go towards all the investors as a group, that is, to the firm.85 Their duty
is analogous to the principle in the law of trusts known as "the duty of
impartiality." This is a duty that pushes trustees in the direction of considering
the trust as a whole: A creates a trust where the income is to be distributed to B
during her lifetime, with the principal distributed to C upon B's death. The
trustee has duties running to both beneficiaries and their interests conflict.
86
The trustee may, for example, be forced to choose between an investment that
offers high current income and one that offers long-term growth.
Other things equal, the trustee should try to maximize the value of the trust
as a whole. In the case of trusts, other things are often not equal. If B is an
elderly widow and C an entirely self-sufficient adult child, the trustee would be
remiss if the trust generated no current income, even if this course would
maximize the expected value of the trust. Maximizing value under these
circumstances runs counter to any sensible interpretation of the settlor's intent.
The law of trusts does not require the trustee to act robotically or without
regard to the particular needs and interests of those for whom she is taking care.
Rather the trustee's obligation is to "act impartially and with due regard for the
diverse beneficial interests created by the terms of the trust."
87
85. Judge Easterbrook, of course, was not expressly setting out this idea as a principle
of corporate law. As noted, In re Central Ice Cream is a bankruptcy case. Moreover, as a
sitting judge of an inferior federal court, Easterbrook's views on first principles of state
corporation law would not be binding in any event. The idea is not also an entirely new one.
The U.K. Companies Act of 2006 provides that directors are obligated to "promote the
success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole." Companies Act 2006, c.
46, § 172(1), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/ukpga_20060046 en 1.
86. See AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER & MARK L. ASCHER,
SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 17.15, at 1259, § 20.1, at 1462 (5th ed. 2007). There is a
related literature on common agency. See also supra note 29.
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79(1)(a) (2007). An interesting modem
example is the battle for control of Dow Jones, Inc., the publisher of, among other things, the
Wall Street Journal. Media mogul Rupert Murdoch made a bid for Dow Jones at $60 per
share in cash (it was trading at about $34 before the offer). The complication was that about
sixty-four percent of Dow Jones shares were held in various trusts for descendents of the
Bancroft family. Some of the family members-the young ones generally-preferred the
cash, while other family members-the old ones generally-valued the "journalistic
integrity" of the paper, so objected to it falling into the hands of the controversial Mr.
Murdoch. See, e.g., Tim Arango, Shaking the Bancroft Family Tree, FORTUNE, May 28, 2007
(describing generational split). In this case, the conflicting issue for the trustee is not
different monetary valuations, but money versus idiosyncratic preferences. We cannot
imagine the law doing much here, short of holding that trustees, like directors, must show
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In the corporate context, it might seem that such complications do not enter
the picture. Maximizing the value of the firm as a whole provides a suitable
benchmark. Investors can diversify their portfolios to protect themselves in the
event maximizing firm value turns out to favor one class of investors over
another. 88 This idea, of course, should not give courts broad license to second-
guess the directors' decisionmaking. A court after the fact may have no easy
way to tell whether the directors in fact used their best judgment to maximize
firm value. A director may not perform as well if she must worry whether each
decision maximizes firm value.89 Hence, there should also be a relatively
forgiving business judgment rule. In law-and-economics circles, this is
probably the conventional wisdom and indeed coupling firm-maximization
with a broad business judgment rule may in fact be a sensible way to think
about the problem, but as we discuss in the next Part of the paper, it is not the
only way.
III. A CONTRACTARIAN SOLUTION
In the last Part, we suggested that corporate law might sensibly adopt the
principle that directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation as a whole. They
are obliged to make decisions that maximize the value of the entire pie, not any
particular slice. The exact contours of the duty turn in some measure on how
the business judgment rule is applied, but the benchmark is easy to state. In this
Part, however, we suggest that this conception of directors' duties is far from
self-evident. Among other things, it seems inconsistent with important features
of standard venture capital contracts. 90 These contracts are especially
illuminating. They are heavily negotiated by informed and sophisticated
parties, are made in a highly competitive environment, and are extremely
up, work hard, and not line their own pockets.
88. See Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional
Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REv. 214 (1999). Smith argues that since
investors are presumed to hold a market basket of securities, the average investor's portfolio
will have the same equity holdings to debt holdings ratio as the average equity to debt ratio
in the capital structure of firms. Accordingly, an investor who loses as a shareholder in one
firm will make it up as a debt holder in that firm or in the fortunes of another firm. Alon
Chaver and Jesse Fried add an important coda to Smith's argument, noting that
"performance creditors," that is, those owed contractual performance instead of cash, should
be considered in any analysis of fiduciary duties. Alon Chaver & Jesse M. Fried, Managers'
Fiduciary Duty upon the Firm's Insolvency: Accounting for Performance Creditors, 55
VAND. L. REV. 1813 (2002).
89. This is just a standard observation about agency costs. Any mechanism put in place
to ensure that the value of the firm is at all times optimized comes at some cost. Everyone
may be better off ex ante if someone with expertise has discretion even if her incentives
distort decisionmaking to some extent. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305 (1976).
90. See Barlett, supra note 21, at 83-90 (discussing the conflict created by down-round
financing in venture capital contracts).
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specific about the allocation of control rights at a time in the firm's life-its
formation-when these issues are crucial.91 Orban v. Field, illustrates the
problem of applying fiduciary duties to the firm as a whole. 92
In Orban, the court considered an allegation of a breach of fiduciary duty
brought by a shareholder who claimed the board, dominated by preferred
shareholders, favored their own interests at the expense of common
shareholders'. 93 Office Mart, the firm at issue in the case, was a big-box
supplier of stationery supplies that tried to expand its operations and failed. The
board backed a merger transaction with office supply giant Staples, but the
amount realized from the sale was not enough to satisfy the liquidation
preferences of the preferred stockholders. As a result, if the deal went through,
the common stockholders would get nothing.
Staples required that the merger be approved by over ninety percent of
Office Mart shareholders. To make this possible, the Office Mart board gave
cash to its preferred shareholders to buy warrants to dilute the common
shareholders below ten percent, thus ensuring approval of the merger. The
largest common stockholder brought suit against the directors, pointing out that
this action on the part of the directors, along with others, had the effect of
bringing about a transaction that wiped out his interest entirely and therefore
violated the duty they owed him. Moreover, the directors themselves were
holders of preferred stock and stood to benefit from the transaction with
Staples. Hence, they violated their duty of loyalty as well as their duty of care,
and the business judgment rule was therefore unavailable. Nevertheless, the
court upheld the board's actions. In doing so, it had to acknowledge that a
board could indeed take actions (such as implementing a change in the
corporate charter needed to accommodate the prospective buyer) that were
manifestly contrary to the interests of the principal common shareholder:94 "A
board may certainly deploy corporate power against its own shareholders in
some circumstances-the greater good justifying the action-but when it does,
it should be required to demonstrate that it acted both in good faith and
reasonably." 95
The court grounded this decision-that the board had acted in good faith
and in reasonable way-in part on the fact that the preferred shareholders were
themselves not being paid in full. Of course this should not be sufficient, or
maybe even relevant. Even though the preferreds were taking something of a
91. The other crucial time in a firm's life is its death, and financial distress raises the
same issues. Not surprisingly, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs have a firm's death in
mind when bargaining for control rights at firm creation.
92. No. 12820, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 48 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997).
93. Id. at *2-3 ("[Plaintiffs' claim] asserts that the board, which was controlled by
holders of preferred stock, exercised corporate power against the common and in favor of the
preferred and, thus, breached a duty of loyalty to the common.").
94. See id. at *29.
95. Id.
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hit by selling immediately, their incentives were still distorted. An immediate
sale always involves trading off the costs of waiting with the prospective
benefits. The preferreds suffered all of the former, but reaped only a small part
of the latter. Merely observing that they enjoyed part of the upside does not tell
us whether they made the proper decision.
There were facts in Orban that made things easier for the court. The
principal shareholder did not dispute that the transaction was in fact the best
course for the corporation as a whole. 96 The number of prospective buyers
(other big-box office supply stores) was small, so the deal may have been one
of last resort. Moreover, the common shareholder seems to have acted badly.
The shareholder gave his implicit support for the deal, only to withdraw it later
merely in an effort to extract some of the purchase price from the preferreds.
97
The willingness of the court to stand behind the directors in Orban,
however, makes sense without any of this. Office Mart had a governance
structure that, like most venture-backed deals,98 departed dramatically for the
typical one in which power is centered on the common shareholders. One
explanation is that venture capitalists generally own preferred as well as
common stock (or various convertible varieties thereof), while the
entrepreneur/founder has only common stock.99 In addition, preferred as well
as common stockholders vote. Hence, when the venture capitalist controls the
majority of the preferred and common combined, the levers of power are in the
hands of senior investors, even though they are not the residual owners of the
business. Venture capital contracts take other forms as well, but they do share
one essential feature. When firms are distressed (whether they are insolvent,
near insolvent, or not), control always resides with the senior owner, not the
residual owner. Giving the venture capitalists or other senior investors the
ability to pull the plug in bad states of the world is an unambiguous part of the
ex ante investment contract.
This governance structure comes with an obvious downside. A board that
96. See id at *26 n.23 ("There is no claim that ... the merger.., was not in the best
interests of the corporation.").
97. See id. at *22 ("[l]t is clear that negotiations ensued in which Mr. Orban attempted
to extract a payment of $4 million from the company in exchange for his agreement to
support the merger.").
98. For a general discussion of venture capital structures and exit strategies, see D.
Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REv. 315 (2005). More
and more firms are seeing radical changes to their financial structure as a result of the surge
in private equity investments and going-private transactions. (In terms of the corporate
finance issues discussed herein, venture capital and private equity investments are similar.)
The problems of senior investors holding tranches of debt and equity, along with board seats,
conversion rights, and other contracted-for rights, participating with common shareholders is
likely to become much more common in light of these trends.
99. One of these reasons is tax. See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of
Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 967, 984-86 (2006) ("[T]he use of
preferred stock rather than common stock can reduce the tax cost of equity-based incentive
compensation given to founders and other employees of the startup.").
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acts on behalf of a senior investor will tend to play it safe. Directors will resist
taking on new projects or even agreeing to keep the firm operational, as they
enjoy none of the upside and suffer the consequences if things go badly.100 In a
case such as Orban, we can see how this may distort decisionmaking. The
business was worth enough to pay the preferred shareholders more than ninety
percent of what they were owed if sold immediately. 1 0 1 From the perspective of
the preferred stockholders, the additional energy and monies spent on finding a
buyer would not be well spent. They faced all the downside from waiting,
while someone else (the principal common shareholder) would enjoy most of
the upside. Of course, the principal common shareholder took the opposite
view. He had nothing to gain from the sale, so waiting for a better offer could
only make him better off.
In venture capital deals, everyone begins knowing that things may not
work out and the time to shut down or sell out may come. And, as discussed
above, no one type of investor has perfect incentives. Nevertheless, someone
must be able to make this decision, even though no one's incentives are
perfectly aligned. The deals struck suggest that the comparative advantage
belongs to the venture capitalist. They always retain control over the shutdown
decision in bad states of the world. Venture capitalists are repeat players and
they may be best able to decide when to pull the plug, notwithstanding their
skewed incentives. 102 In light of this contracting regularity, it would seem odd
100. See Smith, supra note 98.
101. See Orban, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 48, at *23-24 ("[T]he company extended
sufficient consideration to the Series C holders ($3,013,995) to enable them to exercise
warrants to permit them, as a group, to hold more than 90% of Office Mart's outstanding
common stock.").
102. Consider the launch of Apollo 12. Lightening struck the rocket carrying the
Apollo 12 module shortly after takeoff causing the computers on board to shut down. In such
situations, those in control must both look for a solution and decide how long to look before
aborting the mission. The abort switch was entrusted to Pete Conrad, the commander of the
mission. He did not know how to fix the problem, but he waited long enough for a steely-
eyed ground controller to suggest a fix and fellow astronaut, Alan Bean, to implement it. See
Apollo 12 Lightning Strike, http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/spacecraft/q0140.shtml.
Conrad's incentives to abort the mission at the optimal time were not perfect. He was not
perfectly informed and did not completely internalize all the interests at stake. We can
imagine elaborate, theoretically more perfect alternatives such as a voting mechanism among
the astronauts or by mission control executives or engineers, carefully calibrated according
to experience, perspective, optimism, dispassion, residual loss bearers, information, and so
on. But simple solutions sometimes work best. Putting the abort switch in the hands of the
mission commander worked in this instance and may have been the best choice under all the
circumstances. In the corporate environment, there also needs to be some mechanism to
ensure the shutdown decision is made optimally, and here too simple, imperfect solutions
may work best. Although stories could be told about why one decision mechanism or
another is preferable, outsiders should be careful about meddling in the choice of
experienced professionals and should be very leery about writing rules that inhibit choice.
Although the analogy here is imperfect, it shows how decision rules are complex and
difficult to unpack from all of the other elements of a successful space (or corporate)
endeavor.
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for courts to stand in the way.
Orban seems to stand for the proposition that directors can take actions that
are in the best interests of the corporation as a whole even when they take
actions that are manifestly self-interested or favor non-fiduciaries over
fiduciaries. 0 3 But to take advantage of this rule, the directors may be forced to
show the "entire fairness" of the transaction to the corporation as a whole.10 4 It
is consistent with the idea that directors should make decisions that are value
maximizing ex post.
But this may not get things quite right. The founders of the firm take an
equity stake, which in most cases gives them an incentive to manage well, but
giving venture capitalists an option to exercise control rights in some bad states
of the world, even when their exercise would destroy firm value, may give the
founders or their agents an extra incentive to do well. In other words, selfish
control rights may be given to senior claimants to give junior claimants
(including shareholder-managers) an added motivation to avoid bad states of
the world.
This theory is supported by other contracts we observe. Well-established
models of debt posit that loan covenants serve as trip wires. 10 5 If actually
tripped, value is lost, but the trip wires need to exist in order to give those in
control the right incentives. It is but a small step to recognize that when senior
investors succeed to control, they will also act in a way that is not necessarily
value maximizing ex post. No one doubts that loan covenants, even those that
are value-reducing ex post, should be enforced and that they may in fact
vindicate the ex ante bargain. The exercise of control rights by senior investors
may operate in the same way.
While this is certainly a plausible explanation, we need not know the exact
reason why we see these control rights to presume that they are efficient. The
fact that they are ubiquitous and have persevered in a highly competitive
industry is enough to give corporate law pause before disrupting them.
Whatever the reason for their existence, the evidence suggests that the venture
capitalists bargained ex ante to act in the way the preferred shareholders did in
Orban, without answering the question of whether the deal they struck was
value maximizing for the firm as a whole. 10 6 Giving senior investors control
103. See Orban, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 48, at *29.
104. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d. 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (requiring
defendants in entire fairness inquiry to show that the transaction in question was entirely fair
to the corporation).
105. See, e.g., George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive
Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1073, 1093 (1995) (arguing that loan covenants
"serve as trip wires for the lender's right to ... enforce or to intervene in the borrower's
decisions").
106. This, of course, does not excuse some types of self-dealing on the part of the
venture capitalist or any other senior investors. Consider the following scenario: The venture
capitalist makes an initial investment in a startup, taking convertible preferred shares and a
board seat. The venture capitalist board member dominates the board, reassuring other
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rights at certain times may be efficient, even if they use these rights to serve
their selfish ends at the expense of firm value. The granting of this real option
to creditors may create just the right incentives for shareholder managers to
operate the firm efficiently in the first place.
The ability to put in place directors who would engage in a sale that suited
the interests of the preferred stockholders is not different from a secured
creditor who bargains for the right to repossess collateral in the event of default
and who can exercise that right without having to show that it is value
maximizing ex post. The founders and common shareholders agreed that if
things went well, they would all get rich, but if things went badly, the investors
would come first. Imposing fiduciary duties in this environment, even one that
imposed a duty to the corporation as a whole and that came with a generous
business judgment rule, is a potential source of mischief.
IV. APPLICATION: DELINKING DISCLOSURE DUTIES
Ridding corporate law entirely of the idea of fiduciary duties would force
the reconceptualization of a number of features of the law in ways that are
potentially healthy. We consider one of these here--disclosure. Under current
law, directors' disclosure obligations are tied inexorably to their fiduciary
duties. Hence, material nonpublic information must be disclosed when
transacting with shareholders, but not with creditors. As financial innovation
makes the difference between debt and equity less important, this distinction is
becoming increasingly hard to justify. A more sensible approach is one that
decouples th,.c disclosure obligations from other duties and also makes it easier
for sophisticated professionals both to opt out of disclosure obligations and opt
into them. 10 7 Fiduciary duties restrict free contracting in ways that are plainly
inefficient.
directors that funding options are abundant, while encouraging profligate spending, and all
the while knowing that turning away deals is going to force the firm into desperation, and
thereby forcing the firm to agree to additional financing from the venture capital firm on
onerous terms. The venture capital firm arranges a bridge loan to the firm, taking nearly free
warrants that dilute entirely the value held by common shareholders. If the common
shareholders could show that the deals the venture capitalist board member turned away
were legitimate, that the board process was insufficient, and that the board was dominated by
a director with a conflict of interest, it could overcome Orban, since the transaction in
question was not the final deal, but the entirety of the firm's search for financing.
107. Easterbrook and Fischel reach a similar conclusion, albeit for different reasons.
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 269-70 ("'Fiduciary duties' are a questionable
basis on which to distinguish insiders from others .... It is not at all clear that the distinction
between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' matches the class of trades that would be prohibited by
contract ... ").
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A. Disclosure Duties
The classic common law case on disclosure obligations is Goodwin v.
Agassiz. 1°8 In this case, the plaintiff learned negative news about the prospects
for a mining company from a newspaper article, while two directors learned
positive news from a confidential (that is, non-public) geological report. 10 9 The
directors bought shares through a broker on a stock exchange. The positive
news eventually became public and the stock rose. The seller of the stock that
the directors had acquired sued. He claimed that, because he was a shareholder
at the time of the sale, the directors owed him a fiduciary duty and precluded
them from trading with him when they possessed material information he did
not. 110
The court rejected the claim. It distinguished the actions of the directors
under these facts from the situation in which they had sought out the
shareholder or where the corporation was obliged to disclose the information to
the shareholders as a group:
An honest director would be in a difficult situation if he could neither buy nor
sell on the stock exchange shares of stock in his corporation without first
seeking out the other actual ultimate party to the transaction and disclosing to
him everything which a court or jury might later find that he then knew
affecting the real or speculative value of such shares. Business of that nature is
a matter to be governed by practical rules. 
111
In recent decades, however, the law evolved in a different direction. In a
case with facts quite similar to Goodwin, the SEC brought an enforcement
action against executives of a mining firm who traded on an anonymous stock
exchange with investors who were at the same informational disadvantage-
they did not know that a large ore deposit had been discovered on land that the
firm was buying from unsuspecting farmers. 112 The Second Circuit found the
directors liable to the sellers of the stock, on the ground that the securities laws
intended "that all members of the investing public should be subject to identical
market risks" and that investors had to trade "on an equal footing" with each
108. 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933).
109. Id. at 659 ("They had certain knowledge, material as to the value of the stock,
which the plaintiff did not have.").
110. Id. at 660 ("The contention of the plaintiff is that the purchase of his stock in the
company by the defendants without disclosing to him as a stockholder their knowledge of
the geologist's theory . . . constitute actionable wrong for which he as stockholder can
recover.").
111. Id. at 661. The U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the rule that a disclosure obligation
may exist in face-to-face transactions in Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). The minority
rule prevalent in a handful of states is that directors have a duty to disclose all material
information to shareholders before trading with them. See, e.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 232
(Ga. 1903) (holding that a director must always disclose material facts when trading against
a shareholder).
112. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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other. 113
Several years later, the United States Supreme Court (with the help of then
Deputy Solicitor General Frank Easterbrook) l 14 recognized that requiring
everyone to trade "on an equal footing" with one another cut much too
broadly.11 5 Congress could not have intended "a general duty between all
participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material,
nonpublic information." 116 Markets exist only if those with information are
able to profit by trading on it. 117 Moreover, trading by those with information
brings the market into equilibrium and ensures that prices more accurately
reflect underlying values.
To cabin the reach of disclosure obligations under the securities laws,
Justice Powell tied them to fiduciary duties: "Section 10(b) is aptly described as
a catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud."' 18 He therefore found
that a failure to disclose inside information triggered liability only if there were
a duty to speak and this duty exists only "when one party has information 'that
the other ... is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation
of trust and confidence between them."'' 119
113. Id. at 852.
114. Instead of relying on the broad grounds on which the government had won below,
Easterbrook pressed for a conviction based on Chiarella's misappropriation of inside
information. Brief for the United States at 70-71 n.48, Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222 (1980) (No. 78-1202). Easterbrook's name does not actually appear on the brief, as he
left the Solicitor General's office just before it was filed. (The brief was filed in early August
1979 and Easterbrook departed in July of the same year. See Curriculum Vitae of Frank H.
Easterbrook, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/easterbrook/cv.html.) But Easterbrook's
portfolio up until the time he left included all economic matters, and his fingerprints on the
brief are manifest to anyone familiar with his work. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider
Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981
SuP. CT. REV. 309, 314-17. While the government did not prevail on Easterbrook's
misappropriation theory, the government's brief did direct the Court away from an
inappropriately broad view of insider trading. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233 ("Formulation of
such a broad duty, which departs radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from
a specific relationship between two parties ... should not be undertaken absent some explicit
evidence of congressional intent.").
115. 445 U.S. at 233.
116. Id.
117. No one invests in gathering information about securities if they cannot profit from
trading on it. See, e.g., HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966)
(arguing that insider trading laws reduce incentives for investing in information about firm
value).
118. 445 U.S. at 234-35.
119. Id. at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)). As the
law has later developed, liability can also exist even if the person who trades violates a
fiduciary duty he owes to someone other than the person with whom he is trading. See
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997) (applying misappropriation theory). For
example, an employee who learns that his company is about to make a tender offer violates
lOb-5 if he violates his obligations to his employee and purchases stock of the target. See id.
This source of liability is not relevant to our discussion here.
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Over time, a tighter link between disclosure obligations and fiduciary duty
has displaced the "practical rule" established in Goodwin.120 Under modem
securities law, we can be fairly certain that if the corporation is in possession of
information about the business that is material and nonpublic, it cannot engage
in equity trading without disclosing it. Directors (acting for the firm) owe the
firm's existing shareholders fiduciary duties and therefore cannot disadvantage
them for the benefit of the directors or even the firm. By contrast, a corporation
is under no obligation to disclose information to strangers (such as the
unsuspecting farmers who sell the mineral rights in the first instance).1 21
Although perhaps helpful in steering the SEC away from its extreme
position, the linkage between disclosure and fiduciary duties produces odd
results. Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Jordan v. Duff and Phelps, Inc. is a
prime example. 122 In Jordan, a resignation by the plaintiff led to a fairly simple
contract dispute about a shareholder agreement between a closely held firm and
the plaintiff, who owned a few shares. The issue was whether the firm had to
disclose information about inchoate merger negotiations when it bought back
shares pursuant to the shareholder agreement, even though it made no promises
to do so and the parties agreed on a set price for buy-back of the shares. The
court found a duty to disclose based on the syllogism: the employee was a
shareholder, shareholders of firms are owed fiduciary duties, and holders of
fiduciary duties are owed disclosures that others aren't. As discussed at length
elsewhere, this conflation of fiduciary duties and disclosure is suspect and leads
to smallish state law contract cases becoming federal disclosure cases, as well
as potentially disrupting free contracting for investors and firms great and
small.123
The tight linkage between disclosure obligations and fiduciary duties
carries with it the implication that directors do not have disclosure obligations
towards creditors, who are not owed fiduciary duties generally. This is again
almost right. Requiring disclosure to creditors as a general matter surely cuts
too far. It is almost impossible to enter into an economic relationship of any
consequence without creditor-debtor relationship arising. A steady supplier
who sells on open account is a creditor, as is a customer who makes a deposit.
It is but a short step from imposing an obligation to disclose to creditors to
making an obligation to disclose to everyone. But what if a corporation in
financial distress seeks to borrow additional money from an existing creditor
who is, by any measure, a major stakeholder? In such cases, are they obliged to
be more forthcoming than they would be to a complete stranger?
120. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (Mass. 1933).
121. See Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. 178 (1817) (holding that contracting party had no
duty to disclose material fact-in this case, the end of the War of 1812-to a stranger on the
other end of the bargain).
122. 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987).
123. See M. Todd Henderson, Deconstructing Duff and Phelps, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
1739 (2007).
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B. Big Boys and Anti-Big Boys
The rise and collapse of Global Crossing raised precisely this issue.
124
Global Crossing was formed in 1997 to close one of the last gaps in the
Internet. The telecommunications cables connecting the continents were too
small to accommodate the expected growth in Internet use outside of North
America. In 1997, those outside North America accounted for only twenty
percent of Internet use. By 2000, they were expected to account for almost
half.1
25
To take advantage of this change, Global Crossing laid a trans-Atlantic
cable within ten months and embarked on ambitious plans to create a global
fiber network. It reached $1 billion in revenues within its first twenty months.
Global Crossing continued to invest billions in creating the first network of
fiber-optic cable across the world's oceans. Global Crossing's fall, however,
was as swift as its rise. Competitors appeared. Internet traffic grew, but not at
the rate expected. Moreover, technological innovation allowed much more
information to be carried over the same cable. As a result, there was massive
overcapacity in the industry. Global Crossing's revenue barely paid its ongoing
expenses, and its stock price collapsed. 1
26
When times were good, J.P. Morgan made large loans to Global Crossing
and also established lines of credit that Global Crossing could draw down
provided it met specified revenue goals. As Global Crossing's financial
condition deteriorated, its directors told J.P. Morgan that it had met its revenue
goals and J.P. Morgan allowed it to draw down on the multi-billion dollar
credit line.
After Global Crossing collapsed, J.P. Morgan discovered that Global
Crossing had met the revenue numbers needed to draw on the credit line
through a loophole in the credit agreement. The agreement allowed Global
Crossing to count as current revenue money it would receive from other
carriers who leased fiber-optic cable to it. Global Crossing entered into many
such leases with carriers who, at the same time, leased fiber-optic cable back
from Global Crossing. The payment obligations each owed the other netted out
to zero, but the credit agreement did not require that Global Crossing's own
payment obligations be offset against the payments it was receiving when it
reported its revenue. As a result, Global Crossing could enter into leases of
cable that neither it nor the other party would ever use and the only
consequence would be the illusion of revenue that did not in fact exist.
While Global Crossing disclosed that it entered into reciprocal trades, it did
not disclose the extent to which the trades had been entered into solely for the
124. JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Winnick, 350 F. Supp. 2d 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
125. For an account of Global Crossing's rise, see GEORGE GILDER, TELECOSM: How
INFINITE BANDWIDTH WILL REVOLUTIONIZE OUR WORLD 183-90 (2000).
126. Reinhardt Krause, More Worries Surface About Global Crossing After Canceled
Merger, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Nov. 13, 2001, at A8.
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purpose of creating the appearance of revenue. If J.P. Morgan knew just a little
more about these reciprocal trades than it was told, it would not have allowed
the draw on the credit line. Of course, if J.P. Morgan could show that the
directors affirmatively lied to it and that it relied on these lies, it could prevail
under an ordinary fraud action. But showing scienter on the part of the directors
was hard, and J.P. Morgan would have a much easier row to hoe if Global
Crossing and its directors had an affirmative duty to disclose.
If J.P. Morgan bought several billion dollars' worth in Global Crossing
stock under similar circumstances instead of providing the same amount in the
form of debt, it could sue the directors for failing to disclose the way the
revenue numbers were generated. Just as the directors of a closely held firm
who ask a shareholder for a cash infusion must disclose all of the relevant facts
about its financial position or face personal liability for negligent
misrepresentation, so too Global Crossing's directors would face liability if it
were seeking an equity contribution from J.P. Morgan.
But given existing conceptions of fiduciary duty, there is no similar
liability when directors seek an additional loan from an existing creditor.
Because a corporation, by the conventional account, has no fiduciary
relationship towards its creditors, the corporation and its directors have no
obligation to disclose material, nonpublic information to them.127 The District
Court in JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Winnick rejected the argument that there
were such disclosure obligations on just these grounds. 128
Of course, one could argue that a duty to creditors in fact existed. As we
discussed in Part II, courts in Delaware have recognized that a duty to creditors
does exist when the corporation is in the "zone of insolvency." One might
argue that, given that Global Crossing was in the "zone of insolvency" at the
time it drew on the credit line, it did in fact have a duty to disclose to J.P.
Morgan. Even if J.P. Morgan has no right to bring a direct action against the
directors for breach of duty, the duty may itself be sufficient to allow an action
for failure to disclose.
But it does not make sense to go down a path that makes anything turn on
fiduciary duties. One cannot sensibly allocate disclosure duties by sorting
through different types of investors. The characteristics that delineate investor
topology-mostly cash flow and voting rights-are, at best, weakly correlated
with investor labels. A high-yield junk bond (creditor) and ordinary equity
(shareholder) are similar to each other, not only with respect to the cashflow
rights, but also with respect to control rights. The covenants on the typical junk
bond give creditors enormous control over the board and the corporation,
including control over matters shareholders themselves do not control, such as
the hiring and firing of the CEO.
127. Under Rule lOb-5, there is also the additional question of whether the bank loan
counts as a "security."
128. See Winnick, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 401.
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In addition, creditors often have close relationships that mimic those of
shareholders who are owed fiduciary duties. As discussed above, firms
generally owe strangers no duties (think of the farmers with oil under their
land) while having to treat those close to them (think of ordinary shareholders)
differently. But increasingly creditors look more like the latter than the former.
Return to the example of J.P. Morgan and Global Crossing. In this case, J.P.
Morgan was as far from being a stranger (such as a farmer who sells mineral
rights to a mining company) as one can imagine. It is closer to the firm than the
typical shareholder who buys on an exchange. It had invested billions in the
business, had done extensive due diligence, and was already entitled to all the
information that the corporation possessed. It is odd to find that a director has
no more duty to disclose information to such an investor than to a complete
stranger.
The question of what disclosure duties exist might more sensibly turn not
on notions of fiduciary duty, but on the relative ability of the parties to contract
or expand the disclosure obligation that the law otherwise puts in place. It
might seem that opting out of (or into) a disclosure requirement would be easy
for a sophisticated investor such as J.P. Morgan, and therefore that the law need
not give it much. The law on this point, however, is not clear.
On its face, disclosure obligations under the securities laws cannot be
waived at all. 129 Nevertheless, an essential element of an action (either at
common law or under securities law) is the injured party's reliance on the
nondisclosure. This has allowed a practice to emerge in specialized markets in
which trading by those with material, nonpublic information is common and
both parties want to opt out of any disclosure obligations the law imposes. They
exchange what are called "Big Boy" letters. Each party asserts that it is a
sophisticated investor (a "Big Boy"), recognizes that the other may possess
material, nonpublic information, and affirms that it is not in any way relying on
the other's failure to disclose that information. Whether Big Boy letters work
remains to be seen, 130 but they should, at least if the one signing the Big Boy
letter is a sophisticated investor like J.P. Morgan.131
If Big Boy letters work and if disclosure duties cannot be easily created by
contract (a subject to which we return below), then it becomes easy to argue in
favor of strong background disclosure obligations, at least with respect to any
transactions in which the relationship between the parties is as well established
129. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 29(a) (2000).
130. Courts are split on whether these contracts are valid waivers of claims under the
securities laws. Compare Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 341-48 (2d Cir. 1996)
(upholding contract and dismissing claim), and Jensen v. Kimble, 1 F.3d 1073, 1074 (10th
Cir. 1993) (same), with AES Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co., 325 F.3d 174, 180 (3d Cir. 2003)
(refusing to hold as a matter of law that nonreliance provisions are sufficient to immunize
any Rule lOb-5 claims).
131. See Daniel M. Sullivan, Comment, Big Boys and Chinese Walls, 75 U. CHI. L.
REv. 533 (2008).
March 2008] 1339
HeinOnline  -- 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1339 2007-2008
STANFORD LA W RE VIEW
as the one between J.P. Morgan and Global Crossing. In a world where an
investor is owed no duties of disclosure, an investor's ability to ensure that it
receives the relevant information requires it to ask the right questions. This is
by no means easy when the challenge is not gaining access to information, but
rather in having access to so much that it is hard to sort and process. With
respect to Global Crossing, J.P. Morgan had access to all the relevant
information, but it lacked the ability to make sense of it.
Under these circumstances, it may make sense to have a menu of different
disclosure obligations embedded in the law that investors (and anyone else
contracting with the corporation) could invoke in their original contracts. 132 In
other words, J.P. Morgan should have had the option to include a clause in its
original loan agreement that, at least with respect to disclosure obligations,
directors have the same duties toward it that they would have vis-A-vis someone
to whom the corporation owed a fiduciary duty (without at the same time
generating the fiduciary duty itself). A sensible menu provides a discrete array
of choices that courts can interpret over time. It may provide parties with more
certainty than they could enjoy for a term they crafted themselves. 133 The law
could provide other types of disclosure obligations, but the key is separating the
disclosure obligation from the duty itself.
Such a "menu" of disclosure choices allows parties to write what is, in
effect, an "anti-Big Boy" letter. In a Big Boy letter, sophisticated investors opt
for the menu choice of "none of the above." In an anti-Big Boy letter, two
sophisticated parties agree that, in circumstances where the law sees no duties,
they will treat each other not like strangers, but like shareholders or others to
whom disclosure obligations are owed. Of course, if it were as easy to write an
anti-Big Boy letter that opts in to disclosure obligations as to write the standard
one that opts out of them, providing a menu would not be necessary and the
disclosure obligation the law provides as a baseline would be of little moment.
But fashioning an anti-Big Boy letter may not be easy under current law.
Personal liability of the directors is an essential ingredient of any
disclosure obligation in this context. Without it, the investor's only cause of
action for the failure to disclose is against a party (the corporation) that already
is liable on the underlying obligation. (J.P. Morgan already has a claim against
Global Crossing for the amount of the loan. Being able to hold it liable for
failure to disclose gives it nothing it does not already have.) But it is not at all
132. This idea that the law can play a useful role in providing menus for parties to
draw upon was first developed by Robert Rasmussen. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's
Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51 (1992). In recent
years, others have expanded on this insight. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 3 (2006); Yair Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do? An
Empirical Examination (Yale Law Sch. Working Paper No. 335, 2005).
133. As Michael Klausner has pointed out, providing a menu of choices in such
circumstances may be a way to mitigate the network externalities problem that exists when
each party is forced to craft its own terms. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate
Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 837-41 (1995).
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clear that directors could be held personally liable in the event of a breach of an
anti-Big Boy letter. Directors are not generally parties to a corporation's
contracts, and they may not be liable under current law for breach by the firm
of an anti-Big Boy letter.
One way around this difficulty would be to view the duties a firm adopts
by contract as voluntary fiduciary duties. In the very few cases in which
directors have been held personally liable or have personally paid settlements
for corporate law failings, the allegations involved breaches of fiduciary
duties. 134 In this way, a breach of the terms of the anti-Big Boy letter, such as a
failure to disclose material, non-public information that a similarly situated
shareholder would be entitled to receive, would amount to a breach of the
board's (and therefore individual directors') fiduciary duties.
But courts might be reluctant under current law to impose duties that
ordinarily arise only in a "special relationship" in circumstances where such a
relationship does not exist. Other barriers to free contracting also exist. For
instance, most firm charters contain statutorily authorized exculpatory
provisions that eliminate director liability for breaches of fiduciary duty that are
not disloyal. 135 It may seem simple enough to opt out of exculpatory by-laws,
but this would require an expensive and uncertain shareholder vote, and might
not even work, as the further the parties get from agreements that look like
fiduciary duties, 13 6 the less likely courts will be to hold directors personally
liable under a fiduciary duty-like doctrine.
Under existing law, the directors could, of course, co-sign for the loans, not
in the sense of shouldering a repayment obligation in the event of a default, but
agreeing, by contract, to be personally liable in the event of a failure to meet
specified disclosure obligations. But executing a contract like this in a legal
void would be extremely costly to implement. The directors would demand
clarity about what they were required to do and when they would be liable. A
standardized menu of options can provide more clarity, at least over time.
So where does this leave us? Linking disclosure solely to fiduciary duties,
as is the case today, makes little sense. A modest reform might be for the law to
get out of the way of Big Boy letters and anti-Big Boy letters by rejecting the
rigid linkage between the obligations of directors to, and only to, fiduciaries
and disclosure obligations. In all events, however, the law should stand largely
134. See Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1055,
1068-70 (2006) (finding twelve cases of personally liability over the period between 1991
and 2004, all of which were for securities fraud or breaches of fiduciary duty).
135. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2008).
136. In general, trusts and fiduciary duties are not capable of modification by
exculpatory provisions. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008 (2005) ("(a) A term of a trust
relieving a trustee of liability for breach of trust is unenforceable to the extent that it: (1)
relieves the trustee of liability for breach of trust committed in bad faith or with reckless
indifference to the purposes of the trust or the interests of the beneficiaries; or (2) was
inserted as the result of an abuse by the trustee of a fiduciary or confidential relationship to
the settlor."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222(3) (1959) (same).
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in support of the contracts the parties write, and, where possible, make it easier
(through menus and other devices) for parties to set out their obligations to
each other. And, if one believes that free contracting over disclosure is
relatively easy today (we don't), then instead of a convoluted fiduciary duty
analysis, the court in Global Crossing should have based its decision on the
ground that J.P. Morgan could have contracted for this information or these
duties but did not.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have shown that the concept of directors' duties in
corporate law has been too narrowly conceived and too constrained by outdated
and over-simple notions of capital structure. But the problem is in fact much
more pervasive than this. Conventional accounts of corporate law (whether in
the law and economics literature or elsewhere) have, as a general matter, given
far too much weight to the separateness of debt and equity, and have privileged
equity and the rights of equityholders in co orate law in a way that is now
completely out of step with modem finance.'13
Directors should take from court decisions the simple maxim that they
should do what is in the best interest of the firm, measured from the perspective
of the ex ante bargain among investors. This will mean maximizing firm value
in nearly every case, but, as in Orban, sometimes acting in ways that are selfish
and may not, ex post, always be value maximizing. Board decisions should
follow control rights, wherever and in whatever form they are manifest, and
courts should largely get out of the way. This means courts should refuse to
give creditors fiduciary duties (say in the zone of insolvency), refuse to allow
shareholders to use fiduciary duties as a mechanism for upsetting director
decisions that increase firm value or are conceivably part of the investors' ex
ante bargain, and refuse to perpetuate the inefficient link between disclosure
and fiduciary duties.
Written nearly a century ago, Louis Brandeis's Other People's Money
criticized the way creditors exercised the power they had over firms. Brandeis
137. For example, Lucian Bebchuk's academic project is primarily about increasing
the power of shareholders vis-A-vis managers. Not only are "shareholders" becoming
increasingly hard to define, but Bebchuk, like most others, largely leaves other investors out
of the equation. A recent book-length treatment of the issue of shareholder activism is
typical in its neglect of creditors. In The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism, James Hawley and
Andrew Williams praise the stakeholder model of corporate governance, noting that
"stakeholder claims directly challenge the finance model's assertion that shareholders are the
only ... claimants on the firm's residual profits and those with ultimate control authority."
JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM 85 (2000).
The authors go on to define their claim for stakeholder power: "For example, in its broadest
form a stakeholder perspective takes what can be characterized as the 'social debt' of the
corporation perspective." Id. The authors are not alone in largely ignoring creditors or
"financial debt" and its role in the governance of firms.
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showed that banks were significant investors in and exercised substantial
control over the firms to which they lent. 138 Brandeis then went on to argue that
banks ought to exercise this control with an eye toward the interests of the
middle-class workers who provided the banks' capital. 139 Modem accounts of
corporate governance have forgotten about Brandeis and the centrality of the
creditor in the corporate enterprise. Following Berle and Means's The Modern
Corporation and Private Property, they have focused instead on the diffusion
of equity interests and the resulting separation of ownership and control. 140 Our
Article is about resurrecting Brandeis's positive account-that banks and other
creditors are central to any coherent account of corporate governance-while
leaving aside his populist normative claim for others to take up. Corporate law
has focused too long on shareholders as the sole investors in the corporation,
the sole recipients of director duties and energies, and the sole hope for
constraining the managers of other people's money.
138. See, e.g., BRANDEIS, supra note 4, at 36 (describing the "endless chain" of
transactions that bankers in control of firms used to benefit themselves).
139. Id. at 135-36.
140. See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
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